04/10/2026
Operation Commando was a major United Nations Command (UN) offensive during the Korean War that took place between 3–12 October 1951.
75 years ago, The 8th (King's Royal Irish) Hussars, A and B Squadrons equipped with Centurion tanks took part in Operation Commando
• The Mission: The goal of the operation was to push back the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) and secure the Jamestown Line, establishing a fortified buffer zone to protect critical UN supply lines near Seoul.
• The Role of the 8th Hussars: Operating as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division, the 8th Hussars provided invaluable close armored support to the advancing infantry. They were heavily involved in the brutal fighting around a strategic ridge overlooking the Imjin River known as 'the Hook'.
• Rewriting Tank Warfare: The terrain was exceptionally hilly, wooded, and boggy—highly unfavorable for heavy armor. Despite this, the 8th Hussars successfully negotiated the terrain to provide devastatingly effective close support. This prompted the commander of the US I Corps, General John O'Daniel, to famously remark: "They taught us that anywhere a tank can go, is tank country: even the tops of mountains."
The operation was a United Nations victory. It succeeded in neutralizing the immediate threat to Seoul and marked the end of the fluid "war of maneuver," transitioning the conflict into a static, trench-based war.
From 3-12 October the 8th Hussars supported the successful assaults on the hills Kowang-San and Maryang-San.
‘A’ Squadron was to attack from the high ground, but only three tanks made it up the very steep slopes to lead an assault along a knife-edge ridge, through the forest to get onto the objective.
‘B’ Squadron meanwhile was down in the valleys ‘firing’ the infantry onto position after position, enabling them to move while keeping the enemy’s heads down.
The Battle of Kowang San, Operation Commando , October 1951
"Commando" was the name given this operation, in which the 28 British Commonwealth Brigade was destined to play the major part and bear the brunt of the actual fighting conducted by the Commonwealth Division. 28 Brigade consisted of The King's Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI), The King's Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) and 3 Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) and supported by elements of 29 Brigade, including A & B Squadrons of the 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars and the Northumberland Fusiliers.
The mission of Operation Commando, and the method by which it was to be carried out was as follows, In the West Central Sector of the front, just west of the Imjin River and about ten miles north of the 38th Parallel, there were two dominant hills identified respectively as Hill 355 ( "Little Gibraltar”, Kowang San) and Hill 317 (Maryang San). These two hills were a vital part in the Communist western defences and were assessed by Intelligence to be part of the enemy's main winter defence line. The aim of Operation Commando was to seize these two features.
The attack was to be carried out in two phases.
Phase One, the capture of Hill 355 by the KOSB, supported on the left by the KSLI and on the right by 3 RAR.
Phase Two, the capture of Hill 317 by 3 RAR, supported on the left by st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.
Phase One was only a secondary role for 3 RAR; the Battalion's main effort was the capture of Hill 317. It was the capture of this feature that routed the Communists from this section of the front.
D Day - D Day was 3 October 1951
On 1 October the Brigade moved to assembly areas west of the Imjin River to permit a short approach march and to avoid a long move on the day prior to the actual attack. At 0330 hours (3.30 am) on Wednesday 3 October Phase One of Operation Commando began. B Company 3 RAR, led by Captain "Wings" Nicholls of Melbourne moved to Hills 159/199, which was to the north-west of Hill 355, permitted the Company to give valuable fire support to the KOSB from first light onward. At 0430 hours, A Company, led by Captain "Jim" Shelton of Melbourne moved off, followed by B Company, at first light, which was about 0600 hours. The two Companies came under enemy artillery shelling, and a little later made contact with an enemy patrol, which they quickly dispatched, one prisoner of war was taken. The shelling was not unduly heavy and only slight casualties were suffered.
At this time two tanks of A Squadron the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars were moved forward to join the two Companies; the giant Centurions clambered up seemingly impossible slopes to rake enemy positions with 20 pounder high explosives and machine gun fire.
At 1615hrs 3 Oct 1951 at KOWSANG SAN, Lt Butler was commanding the lead troop of “A” Squadron 8th Hussars who were supporting the attack of 1st Battalion The King's Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) on Points 208 and 210.
The leading tank was mined and the second one was immediately bogged down in the paddy which barred the approach to the climbable hills.
Lt Butler pressed on and by skilful direction ever most difficult country succeeded in reaching the summit of point 208 supported by the surviving tank of his troop. From here he pushed on to the second objective, but his supporting tank bogged down and threw a track leaving him alone.
Some hours elapsed before any further tanks could be got up and throughout the afternoon, Lt Butler despite accurate enemy mortar and artillery shellfire, continued to give close support to the attacking infantry.
The tanks were used much more in this operation than at any previous time, and their value as pin point artillery, at point-blank range, was quite a considerable factor in the capture of a number of positions. The KSLI made steady progress on the southern flank, and throughout the day the KOSB attacked up the central line of approach to Hill 355. The enemy however, had made a determined stand, and nightfall 3 October found the attackers still short of their objective.
At last light the remainder of Lt Butler’s Troop was ordered to withdraw to a company locality where he bombed up from the bogged tank, normal replenishment from the Sun SQMS being impossible due to the rough going.
At 2000hrs 3 Oct, Lt Butler was ordered to take command of the four remaining running tanks on top of the hill for the assault on Point 210 at 0600hrs 4 Oct 51. The Brigade consolidated for the night and prepared for attack at first light the following morning.
This he successfully accomplished and by dogged determination and skilful direction, forced his way through apparently impassable country to the objective arriving with 3 tanks. Throughout the action the attacking infantry received the closest support, the effect of which was apparent on reaching the objective.
To the north of the main objective, Hill 355, there was a sizable feature held by the Communists. During the previous day, the enemy had been able to bring flanking fire from there on to the KOSB attacking from the west. Hence it was decided that C Company 3 RAR, would capture this feature simultaneously with an attack by KOSB onto Hill 355. C Company, under the command of war wise soldier, Major "Jack Gerke" of Western Australia, moved off at dawn. Under the cover of the heavy morning mist, which filled the valleys, C Company crossed the dangerous, low lying ground and commenced the climb up to the steep objective.
The approach route selected was up the steepest part of the feature, and before the Chinese realized their danger, the Australians were attacking. Enemy mortars began pasting C Company, but nothing now could stop the momentum of the attack. Major Gerke himself participated in the final gr***de and machine gun battle. Private "Jimmy" Burnett, a young Bren-Gunner from Queensland, climbed on to a dominating portion of the feature and firing from the hip carved a gap through the ranks of the surprised enemy. C Company quickly consolidated its first advantage, the enemy broke and scattered in hasty retreat. In the meantime, the KOSB, its flank freed from danger by C Company's successful attack, made rapid progress and by early afternoon Hill 355 was in our hands.
Hill 317 - A Tough Nut to Crack
Now that the Chinese knew our intentions, the utmost speed was essential to maintain some element of surprise, so it was decided that on the following day 3 RAR would attack and capture Hill 317. Hill 355 had been hard going, but with some element of surprise now lost as we moved further into the enemy's defence line, it was expected that Hill 317 would be even more strongly held and a tougher nut to crack.
By evening, 4 October, all was ready. The plan briefly was that A Company 3 RAR was to make a feint attack up a ridge line from the east, to occupy the enemy's attention and draw his fire. B Company and D Company were to move by a spur line from the north-east. B Company to clear the lower features and D Company to pass through and capture Hill 317. C Company would remain in reserve The move commenced at 0400 hours 5 October. First light came, and a heavy mist lay in the valleys which sheltered the toiling Companies during the approach march. By 0930 hours, B Company had cleared its features more than halfway to the objective, and D Company was moving up on the left of B Company when suddenly the fog lifted. B Company, under cover of the mist, had secured a commanding feature further to the north, but D Company was dangerously exposed to the Chinese positions. D Company Commander, Major "Basil" Hardiman of NSW, did the only thing he could do with any hope of success, he attacked.
In the history of 3 RAR assault actions in Korea, there had been nothing to equal the Hill 317 for the good leadership by section, platoon and company commanders and for the fine support by the 16 New Zealand Field Regiment and the rest of the divisional artillery.Above all it was the courage of the men who, in the final analysis, wrenched victory from the startled Chinese.
The 3RAR, at that time, had been largely reinforced, and many of the older, experienced members had been relieved. This made not the slightest difference. The youngsters gained inspiration from the old hands and nothing could stop them. Early in the attack, Major Hardiman was seriously wounded in the leg. Lieutenant "Jim" Young, the senior Platoon Commander, took over the attack, and never faltered. There were four distinct features to be cleared. When the first feature was taken, the Commanding Officer (CO) asked Young, "Can you go on ?". The answer was " Give me fifteen minutes of artillery and we will be ready to move". The artillery fell on the objective. D Company attacked again, and the second feature fell to Lieutenant "Algie" Clark's 11 Platoon. Corporal Black, a veteran from Melbourne, was in charge of one of the leading Sections. He was blown from his feet by a gr***de and seriously wounded in the left arm by machine gun fire. Unarmed, he continued to lead the attack, shouting encouragement to his men. 12 Platoon, under Sergeant Bill Rowlinson (later awarded a Bar to his Distinguished Conduct Medal [DCM]) moved through 11 Platoon and continued the attack. In half an hour of taking the first objective the features were ours, and a Chinese Company ceased to exist. It was a mighty effort.
At this point, the CO, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Francis "Frank" Hassett, (later General Sir Francis AC., KBE., CBO., DSO., LVO) made one of the decisions which was responsible for the final victory.
The two assaulting Companies, B and D, could not continue immediately on to Hill 317, both having suffered losses, and the men were exhausted from the tremendous effort. C Company, ten men light from its battle on Hill 355, was ordered to move through D Company and take Hill 317. Knowing that speed was the essence of the contract, Major Gerke raced C Company up to D Company and through. Before the Chinese realised what had happened, Hill 317 was in our hands. It had all been brilliant work, the men were magnificent, the planning and the ex*****on left nothing to be desired. A Company, all this time, had occupied the enemy on the eastern ridge line, being battered by his artillery, engaging him with small arms, making a show of strength, so that not until C Company arrived on the high point behind them did the Chinese realize what was happening.
This, however, was only the beginning; the point consisting of three main features. That night, C Company held a very tight perimeter and absorbed probing attacks.
The next day the Northumberland Fusiliers were to attack up a ridge line from the south and capture the most western of the three pimples; in conjunction with this attack C Company 3 RAR was to probe forward from Hill 317 itself. 8 Platoon, under young Duntroon graduate, Lieutenant Arthur "Bushy" Pembroke, fighting his first big battle, moved off at 0700 hours on 6 October.
It moved unopposed on to the central feature. The Chinese, in that strange, illogical way that they have, had permitted 8 Platoon to occupy, unopposed, a feature that they could have held. The Platoon had only just moved on to the feature when the Chinese, realising their mistake, counter attacked, but they were no match for the Australians and, after a fierce hand-to-hand engagement, they conceded the victory and withdrew.
During the day the Northumberland Fusiliers attacked again and again from the south, but the Chinese, from strongly dug positions, resisted, and by nightfall 6 October no progress had been achieved.
The Northumberland Fusiliers had been badly battered during that day, so it was agreed that on 7 October, 3 RAR should complete the task attacking from Hill 317.
The objective, the last key to the line of features, was called The Hinge, and once it was secured, the Chinese were beaten. B Company was given the task. On the evening of 6 October B Company moved into a position on the centre feature, taking over from Lieutenant Pembroke and his 8 Platoon. At first light, Lieutenant Colonel Hassett (CO 3 RAR) moved his Tactical Headquarters to Hill 317 and from there conducted the battle through the day of 7 October, a day that would be remembered by those who experienced it as one of the hardest that the Battalion had to endure. At 0800 hours (8 am) B Company attacked with two platoons forward. The Chinese permitted the two leading platoons to go through, and then, coming out of concealed positions, attacked Company Headquarters and the reserve platoon. It was a bitter fight and one of the decisive battles of the operation. The reserve platoon and Company Headquarters suffered heavy casualties, but the enemy suffered more and finally broke and scattered. Captain Nicholls quickly consolidated his position and the Company prepared for a counter attack. Several engagements occurred that day, but after a time it was obvious that the enemy was waiting for nightfall to make his main effort. By this time, enemy artillery was falling with dreadful accuracy on Battalion Tactical Headquarters, with C Company on Hill 317 and on B Company on The Hinge. It was unceasing throughout the day and casualties were heavy.
Colonel Hassett calmly directed the battle from his precarious position. He was an inspiration to all ranks. Later, troops back in casualty clearing stations, wounded as a result of the devastating artillery throughout the day of 7 October would ask "How is the CO?" It was the Colonel's first major action with his Battalion, and as a result of it he earned their complete confidence and respect, an important morale builder in the hours to come.
The problem of re-supply and evacuation was a big one. The stretcher bearers worked constantly with complete disregard for their own lives to bring the wounded back to safety. The signaler line-men struggled in the open throughout the day to maintain line communication as enemy artillery blasted great lengths in the cable.
The Korean Porter Train escorts urged their wearying charges up the steep and dangerous slopes, carrying urgently needed am******on and supplies to the r***e companies. Late in the afternoon the shelling slackened somewhat, allowing the toiling signalers to complete the mending of their shattered cable between Battalion Headquarters and the two forward companies. For the first time in hours we were able to converse with a freedom that wireless does not permit. Jack Gerke (C Company), Nick (B Company) and I spoke quickly of the many problems to be dealt with, rations, supplies, am******on, evacuation of the wounded, artillery Defensive Fire tasks (DF's) for the night and many other things that are vital at such times. A joke or two, in spite of the fatigue of a long and heavy day. The CO had another word with his Commanders, everything was ready, ready for the attack which we knew must come.
Chinese Big Artillery Effort
From 1930 hours till 2000 hours an ominous silence pervaded the battlefield and at 2000 hours (8 PM) it came, the heaviest and most concentrated enemy shelling, chiefly on the two forward companies, that the Chinese had yet produced. For thirty minutes it continued, the nerve racking thunder of exploding shells. The telephone cable was blasted in the first volley of shells; hundreds of rounds fell in the Chinese' biggest artillery effort of the war. At 2030 hours the shelling eased and lifted, and the Chinese attacked.
They attacked on three sides, expecting a dazed and battered enemy. Instead, they found an enemy resolute and confident; they attacked not against disorganized defences , but against a blazing perimeter of the Commonwealth’s Tanks, r***es and machine guns. Again and again they attacked, but, in vain.
Our own artillery, by this time was in full swing, and the Chinese were sent reeling back, their hopes of speedy victory completely disillusioned. Three times that night they attacked with blind courage, but could not hope to succeed. Later, it was estimated that the greater part of two Battalions were used in this attack and they lost a very large part of this force in their futile attempts to regain their lost position. By dawn of the morning 8 October 1951 the battle was over, and another victory had been won. Our troops were weary and heavy eyed from the strain of a long fight, but it was a proud moment.
Congratulations came from Army, Corps, Division and Brigade, but the finest tribute of all came from the Commanding Officer, Frank Hassett, when in his official report of the operation, he said of his men ;
"Their sheer guts is beyond belief"
Lt James Charles Butler 8th Hussars was awarded the Military Cross and his driver LCpl Bernard Thomas Childes was mentioned in dispatches. The action of the tanks was a major factor in the success of this attack and saved the attacking infantry many casualties. Lt Butler’s courage, cool headed direction and determination to accompany the infantry was an inspiration both to the infantry and to the other tank crews.
At one time following the success of Operation Commando, the strength of the opposing army was growing so rapidly that at one time they threw three divisions against the hill 355 area alone, with the Chinese army using self-propelled guns or tanks. This required an equal response from the KSLI and their comrades, causing the expenditure of am******on to become very high. On 17th November it was reported that the Mortar Platoon fired nearly 7,000 rounds of am******on, with one man being reported to have fed almost 4+1/2 tonnes ‘down the spout’ in one night whilst under constant enemy fire.
Find out more about the 8th Hussars in Korea at: https://www.qrhmuseum.com/
Extracts from 3 Royal Autrailian Regiments memoirs of the Korean War (koreanwaronline.com) and Lt Butler 8th Hussars citation.
